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1 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 The High Commissioner for Human Rights is the 
principal human rights official of the United Nations. 
The High Commissioner heads the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and spear-
heads the United Nations’ human rights efforts. 
 OHCHR has a mandate to promote and protect 
the enjoyment and full realization of all human rights 
by all people. OHCHR is guided in its work by the 
mandate provided by the General Assembly in resolu-
tion 48/141, the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subse-
quent human rights instruments, the Vienna Decla-
ration and Program of Action from the 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights, and the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 International law authorizes States to exercise 
adjudicatory and prescriptive jurisdiction over civil 
cases involving gross human rights violations and 
serious violations of international humanitarian 
law, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs or the 
 
 1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in 
part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No 
person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel 
made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. 
The petitioners and respondents have filed a letter of consent 
with the Clerk of the Court. 
2 
defendants are nationals of that State, and regardless 
of where the relevant conduct occurred. States may 
exercise such universal civil jurisdiction at least to 
the same extent as they are permitted to exercise 
universal criminal jurisdiction. 
 Without seeking to delineate fully the scope of 
universal jurisdiction, the High Commissioner sub-
mits that States are permitted to exercise universal 
jurisdiction, at a minimum, over genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, torture, slave trading, 
and enforced disappearances. These gross human 
rights violations are of concern to all States and all 
States have a legitimate interest in protecting victims 
and providing them with effective remedies. 
 Where universal criminal jurisdiction is permit-
ted under international law, universal civil jurisdic-
tion is also permitted. From the perspective of the 
victims, who enjoy the right to an effective remedy for 
gross human rights violations, it would be anomalous 
if international law allowed third States to offer one 
aspect of an effective remedy (prosecution of the 
perpetrators), but not the other (adequate, prompt 
and effective reparation). Also, the exercise of civil 
jurisdiction is far less intrusive than criminal juris-
diction vis-à-vis other nations and individual defen-
dants, and hence not subject to more stringent 
limitations. 
 In practice, a number of States combine universal 
criminal with universal civil jurisdiction by allowing 
 
3 
victims to join criminal proceedings brought under 
universal jurisdiction as civil claimants. This State 
practice demonstrates that international law autho-
rizes States to exercise universal jurisdiction in cases 
where victims seek civil remedies for gross human 
rights violations and serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law. 
 The exercise of universal civil jurisdiction over 
gross human rights violations and serious violations 
of international humanitarian law is not only per-
mitted, it is also beneficial from a human rights 
perspective. Universal criminal and universal civil 
jurisdiction complement each other. Both contribute 
to the establishment of an international culture of 
accountability. Both provide victims of the worst vi-
olations with access to justice and effective remedies 
in cases where they are denied access to justice in 
their home countries. The exercise of universal juris-
diction under the Alien Tort Statute has positive 
deterrent effects because the prospect of litigation 
before independent courts provides incentives for 
States, corporations, and individuals to prevent gross 
human rights violations and adapt their practices 
accordingly. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
   
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. International Law Authorizes Universal 
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases Involving 
Gross Human Rights Violations or Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law 
 International law distinguishes among prescriptive 
jurisdiction, adjudicatory jurisdiction, and enforcement 
jurisdiction. A State exercises extraterritorial prescrip-
tive jurisdiction by prescribing rules to be applied 
outside its territory; extraterritorial adjudicatory 
jurisdiction when its courts adjudicate cases involving 
persons, property, or acts outside its territory; and 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction when it 
directly exercises its power on the territory of another 
State. The present case concerns the exercise of 
prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction in relation 
to acts committed outside U.S. territory that are 
illegal under international law. 
 In the S.S. Lotus case, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice set out the basic framework to 
determine the limits of jurisdiction international law 
imposes on sovereign states, and set forth the distinc-
tion between enforcement jurisdiction on the one 
hand, and prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction 
on the other. See S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-20 (Sept. 7). While the 
facts of the case concerned a criminal prosecution, the 
Court stated that its reasoning also applied to civil 
cases. Id. at 20. 
5 
 Regarding the exercise of enforcement jurisdic-
tion in another State’s territory, the Permanent Court 
observed: 
[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed 
by international law upon a State is that – 
failing the existence of a permissive rule to 
the contrary – it may not exercise its power 
in any form in the territory of another State. 
In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territo-
rial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside 
its territory except by virtue of a permissive 
rule derived from international custom or 
from a convention. 
Id. at 18. 
 Conversely, the Permanent Court established 
that the exercise of adjudicative and prescriptive 
jurisdiction in relation to acts abroad – the type of 
jurisdiction involved in this case – is in principle 
permitted, unless specifically prohibited by interna-
tional law: 
It does not, however, follow that interna-
tional law prohibits a State from exercising 
jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of 
any case which relates to acts which have 
taken place abroad, and in which it cannot 
rely on some permissive rule of international 
law. Such a view would only be tenable if in-
ternational law contained a general prohibi-
tion to States to extend the application of 
their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts 
to persons, property and acts outside their 
territory, and if, as an exception to this 
6 
general prohibition, it allowed States to do so 
in certain specific cases. But this is certainly 
not the case under international law as it 
stands at present. Far from laying down a 
general prohibition to the effect that States 
may not extend the application of their laws 
and the jurisdiction of their courts to per-
sons, property and acts outside their terri-
tory, it leaves them in this respect a wide 
measure of discretion, which is only limited 
in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as re-
gards other cases, every State remains free 
to adopt the principles which it regards as 
best and most suitable.  
Id. at 19. 
 A prohibitive rule of customary international law 
of the type contemplated in S.S. Lotus requires 
“general practice accepted as law.” See Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; see also Re-
statement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States § 102(2) (1987) (“Customary interna-
tional law results from a general and consistent 
practice of States followed by them from a sense of 
legal obligation.”). In other words, according to the 
standard set by the S.S. Lotus, if the defendants in 
this case want to show that the exercise of prescrip-
tive and adjudicatory jurisdiction in relation to acts 
committed abroad is prohibited, they would have to 
demonstrate that there is both a general practice 
among States to refrain from exercising such jurisdic-
tion, and that States refrain from doing so because 
7 
they believe they are legally prohibited from doing so. 
Defendants cannot possibly satisfy this standard.  
*    *    * 
 Without seeking to delineate fully the scope of 
prohibited and permissible jurisdiction under inter-
national law, the High Commissioner submits that 
international law permits States to exercise jurisdic-
tion over civil cases involving gross human rights 
violations or serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law regardless of where, by whom and 
against whom such violations were committed.  
 Gross human rights violations and serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law include, at 
a minimum, conduct amounting to genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, slave trading, and en-
forced disappearances. These gross violations are of 
concern to the entire international community and 
are hence no longer considered to be an internal 
affair of the State where they occur. Any State is 
entitled to provide its courts with a special form of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction known as “universal ju-
risdiction” over these gross violations, even if the 
violations take place abroad and do not involve the 
State’s nationals as perpetrators or victims.2  
 
 2 The term “universal jurisdiction,” as used in this brief, 
refers to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases 
where the subject matter of the case has no particular link to the 
State exercising jurisdiction, in particular because neither the 
perpetrator nor the victim has the nationality of the State 
(Continued on following page) 
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A. Customary International Law, Emerg-
ing from the Practice of States and 
Reaffirmed by Several Widely Ratified 
Treaties, Permits States to Exercise 
Universal Jurisdiction in Cases Involv-
ing Gross Human Rights Violations or 
Serious Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law 
 In setting out restrictions on the exercise of 
prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction in relation 
to acts abroad, international law strikes a balance 
between competing goals. On the one hand, States 
have legitimate interests in regulating acts commit-
ted abroad that concern their nationals or that have 
an impact on their territory or other sovereign inter-
ests. On the other hand, international law prohibits 
States from intervening in the internal affairs of 
other sovereign States.  
 
 
exercising jurisdiction, and the underlying conduct occurred on 
the territory of another State.  
 In the terminology of U.S. lawyers, the term “universal 
jurisdiction” relates exclusively to the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the federal courts, not the separate issue of whether the court 
has personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant. With 
regard to personal jurisdiction, a few States exercise universal 
jurisdiction even when the defendant is not present on their 
territory ( jurisdiction in absentia). However, many other States 
exercising universal jurisdiction (including the United States) 
require the defendant to have a presence or activity on their 
territory to justify in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. 
9 
 When it comes to gross human rights violations, 
the balance tilts in favour of the State wishing to 
exercise jurisdiction, because these violations have 
been recognized as being of concern to the entire 
international community and are hence no longer 
considered an internal affair of the State where they 
occur. Instructive in this regard is the observation of 
the International Court of Justice:  
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn 
between the obligations of a State towards 
the international community as a whole, and 
those arising vis-à-vis another State. . . . By 
their very nature the former are the concern 
of all States. In view of the importance of the 
rights involved, all States can be held to 
have a legal interest in their protection; they 
are obligations erga omnes.  
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. 
v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).  
 The Court went on to explain that “[s]uch obliga-
tions [erga omnes] derive, for example, in contempo-
rary international law, from the outlawing of acts of 
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the princi-
ples and rules concerning the basic rights of the 
human person, including protection from slavery and 
racial discrimination.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 In this narrowly defined area of gross human 
rights violations, there is no real concern that the 
State exercising jurisdiction would be projecting its 
own domestic policies or values onto the territory 
10 
of another State. Instead, that State merely offers a 
judicial forum allowing the victims to obtain effective 
remedies for violations that are so obvious and abhor-
rent that the forum state, the territorial state, and 
the international community as a whole recognize 
that they constitute gross violations and that the 
victims must have effective recourse. 
*    *    * 
 The International Court of Justice has not yet 
pronounced itself on the issue of universal jurisdic-
tion. The Court did not address the issue in its 2002 
judgment concerning an arrest warrant issued by 
Belgium against the Foreign Minister of the Democ-
ratic Republic of the Congo pursuant to a statute 
providing Belgian courts with universal jurisdiction 
over war crimes and crimes against humanity. See 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14). In individual opinions 
attached to the judgment, four judges took issue with 
Belgium’s exercise of universal jurisdiction in absen-
tia, which allowed for criminal proceedings even 
where the suspect was never present on Belgian 
territory. See id. at 35, 40-41 (separate opinion of 
President Guillaume); 54, 58 (declaration of Justice 
Ranjeva); 91, 92 (separate opinion of Justice Rezek); 
and 100, 126-127 (separate opinion of Justice Bula-
Bula). At the same time, however, a larger number of 
judges expressed support for the position that inter-
national law permits the exercise of universal juris-
diction. Judges Buergenthal, Higgins, and Kooijmans 
found “certain indications that universal jurisdiction 
11 
for certain international crimes is clearly not re-
garded as unlawful.” Id. at 63, 76 (joint separate 
opinion of Justices Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergen-
thal). Judge Koroma stated that in his “considered 
opinion, today, together with piracy, universal juris-
diction is available for certain crimes, such as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, including the 
slave trade and genocide.” Id. at 59, 61-62 (separate 
opinion of Justice Koroma). Likewise, Judge Van den 
Wyngaert found that international law does not 
prohibit Belgium from exercising universal jurisdic-
tion and noted that “[t]o the contrary, international 
law permits and even encourages States to assert this 
form of jurisdiction to ensure that suspects of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity do not find safe 
havens.” Id. at 137, 176-177 (dissenting opinion of 
Justice Van den Wyngaert). 
*    *    * 
 Since the International Court of Justice issued 
its Arrest Warrant decision in 2002, State practice has 
reaffirmed the legality of universal jurisdiction as 
more States have adopted legislation allowing them 
to exercise such jurisdiction. As of September 2011, 
at least 145 out of 193 United Nations Member States 
– more than three-quarters of the world’s nations 
– had adopted laws providing for some form of uni-
versal jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and/or torture. See Amnesty Intn’l, 
Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of 
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Legislation Around the World 1 (2011) [hereinafter, 
“Survey of Legislation”].  
*    *    * 
 That States accept universal jurisdiction also 
emerges from several widely ratified treaties, which 
are based on the premise that international law 
authorizes the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
 The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which 
have been ratified by the United States of America 
and virtually all other States, require States parties 
to search for and bring to justice any person, regard-
less of his or her nationality, who is alleged to have 
committed or ordered grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions. See Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 
147, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.  
 The “search and bring to justice” obligation 
logically implies that States must also be authorized 
by international law to exercise universal jurisdiction 
over any perpetrators their search identifies, no 
matter where they are from and where and against 
whom they committed war crimes. As also established 
13 
by the comprehensive study of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross on customary interna-
tional humanitarian law, States may therefore vest 
universal jurisdiction over war crimes in their courts. 
See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume 
I: Rules at 604 (2005) (rule 157). 
*    *    * 
 The legal acceptance of universal jurisdiction also 
follows from the Convention against Torture. The 
Convention, adopted without vote by the world’s 
States gathered in the United Nations General As-
sembly, has 150 States parties (including the United 
States of America). See Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-
20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 Article 5 of the Convention stipulates: 
1. Each State Party shall take such meas-
ures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over the offences [of torture] re-
ferred to in article 4 in the following cases: 
(a) When the offences are committed in any 
territory under its jurisdiction or on board a 
ship or aircraft registered in that State; 
(b) When the alleged offender is a national 
of that State; 
(c) When the victim is a national of that 
State if that State considers it appropriate. 
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2. Each State Party shall likewise take 
such measures as may be necessary to estab-
lish its jurisdiction over such offences in 
cases where the alleged offender is present in 
any territory under its jurisdiction and it 
does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 
to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 
I of this article. 
3. This Convention does not exclude any 
criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance 
with internal law. 
Id., art. 5. 
 Seen in comparison with Article 5(1), it is clear 
that Article 5(2) relates to cases committed abroad 
that do not involve nationals as either perpetrators or 
victims. Thus, Article 5(2) requires each State to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over torturers found on 
its territory, unless the State chooses to extradite the 
person. See also Committee against Torture, Conclud-
ing Observations and Recommendations: Nepal, U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/NPL/CO/2, ¶ 18 (15 December 2005); Con-
cluding Observations and Recommendations: Uganda, 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/UGA, ¶ 10(c) (21 June 2005). 
Since a treaty that has been adopted with the ap-
proval of all States obligates States parties to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over torture, it follows that 
international law does not prohibit the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction. 
 States have adopted this norm fully cognizant of 
this implication. The Working Group of States that 
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drafted the text noted specifically that “the inclusion 
of universal jurisdiction in the draft convention was 
no longer opposed by any delegation.” See Report of 
the Working Group on the Draft Convention against 
Torture, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72, at § 26 (1984).  
 The legislative practice of the United States of 
America also embraces this understanding of Article 
5(2), given that U.S. federal criminal law renders 
torture committed anywhere in the world subject to 
universal jurisdiction “as long as the offender is 
present in the United States, irrespective of the 
nationality of the victim or alleged offender.” See 18 
U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(2) (2006). 
 
B. Universal Jurisdiction Extends, at a 
Minimum, to Genocide, Crimes Against 
Humanity, War Crimes, Torture, Slave 
Trading, and Enforced Disappearances 
 Universal jurisdiction was initially applied to 
serious crimes whose perpetrators tended to operate 
outside the jurisdiction of any particular State, 
namely pirates, and later also slave traders, roaming 
the high seas. However, this pragmatic argument was 
always paired with the principled argument that 
perpetrators of such serious crimes violated universal 
values and could hence be considered enemies of all 
mankind. In this respect, Emerich de Vattel, the 
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preeminent international legal scholar of his time, 
explained:  
[A]lthough the justice of each nation ought in 
general to be confined to the punishment of 
crimes committed in its own territories, we 
ought to except from this rule those villains, 
who, by the nature and habitual frequency of 
their crimes, violate all public security, and 
declare themselves the enemies of the hu-
man race. Poisoners, assassins, and incendi-
aries by profession, may be exterminated 
wherever they are seized; for they attack and 
injure all nations, by trampling underfoot 
the foundation of their common safety. Thus, 
pirates are sent to the gibbet by the first into 
whose hands they fall. 
Emerich de Vattel, Law of Nations 179 (1758, re-
printed ed. 1805) (§ 233). 
 Building on this moral underpinning, universal 
jurisdiction has also come to be applied to violations 
so abhorrent that they shock the conscience of human-
ity as a whole. In the context of Israel prosecuting 
holocaust organizer Adolf Eichmann for international 
crimes under universal jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court of Israel explained:  
Not only do all crimes attributed to the ap-
pellant bear an international character, but 
their harmful and murderous effects were so 
embracing and widespread as to shake the 
international community to its very founda-
tions. The State of Israel therefore was enti-
tled, pursuant to the principle of universal 
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jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian 
of international law and an agent for its en-
forcement, to try the appellant. 
Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 
304 (Israel Sup. Ct. 1962). 
 In addition to the international public order ar-
gument, framed so eloquently by the Supreme Court 
of Israel, the application of universal jurisdiction to 
human rights-related violations also rests on a prag-
matic argument that is directly rooted in interna-
tional human rights law. The pirate is covered by 
universal jurisdiction to ensure that he can be 
brought to justice. For the same reason, the perpetra-
tors of gross human rights violations are subject to 
universal jurisdiction so that the victims are not left 
without recourse. In many cases, the State where 
such gross violations are committed is complicit and 
hence unwilling to bring the perpetrators to justice. 
In other cases, such violations are committed in 
States that lack the capacity to govern their territory 
and are hence unable to bring perpetrators to justice. 
In both cases, universal jurisdiction is necessary so 
that the victim is not left without recourse. In that 
sense, universal jurisdiction derives legitimation 
directly from international human rights law, because 
it offers a complementary tool to ensure that victims 
of gross violations can realize their right to an effec-
tive remedy for human rights violations. On the 
foundation of the human right to an effective remedy 
in international law, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Navi 
Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
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Human Rights in Support of Petitioners, pp. 4-12 
(filed in December 2011 in the prior round of briefing 
in this case). 
*    *    * 
 The fact that universal jurisdiction extends 
beyond the historical examples of piracy and the 
slave trade has been recognised by the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law: 
A State has jurisdiction to define and pre-
scribe punishment for certain offenses recog-
nized by the community of nations as of 
universal concern, such as piracy, slave 
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, 
genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain 
acts of terrorism, even where none of the 
bases of jurisdiction [deriving from the terri-
torial, nationality or protective principles] is 
present.  
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States § 404 (1987).  
 In addition to the non-exhaustive list of examples 
offered by the Restatement, the High Commissioner 
submits that States may, at a minimum, also exercise 
universal jurisdiction with regard to crimes against 
humanity, torture, and now also enforced disappear-
ances.  
*    *    * 
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 The United Nations International Law Commis-
sion and numerous other renowned jurists have 
endorsed the position that crimes against humanity 
are subject to universal jurisdiction. See International 
Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 51st 
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 9 (art. 8), U.N. Doc. A/51/10/10 
(1996); International Law Association, Final Report 
on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of 
Gross Human Rights Offences 5 (2000); Princeton 
University Program in Law and Public Affairs, The 
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 28 
(2001) (principles 1.2 and 2.1). 
 The nature of crimes against humanity, a notion 
embodied in the very term “crime against humanity,” 
makes them of concern to the entire State community. 
Therefore, they can be pursued by any State. The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone observed that “one 
consequence of the nature of grave international 
crimes against humanity is that States can, under 
international law, exercise universal jurisdiction over 
such crimes.” Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and Brima 
Bazzy Kamara, Cases No. SCSL-04-15-AR72 and 
SCSL-04-16-AR72 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Appeals Chamber, Mar. 13, 2004), at ¶ 70.  
 State practice confirms that States are allowed to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity. As of 1 September 2011, at least 78 States 
had national laws providing for universal jurisdiction 
over crimes against humanity. See Survey of Legisla-
tion, supra, at 13. 
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*    *    * 
 State practice is even more pronounced with 
regard to the exercise of universal jurisdiction over 
the crime of torture. As of 1 September 2011, at least 
85 United Nations member States had enacted na-
tional laws providing for universal jurisdiction over 
torture. See id. As noted above (pp. 13-15), those 
States that do not yet exercise universal jurisdiction 
over torture have signalled their agreement with the 
principle in supporting the adoption of the Conven-
tion against Torture, which is based on the premise 
that universal jurisdiction over torture is permitted.  
 Further support for the finding that torture is 
subject to universal criminal jurisdiction derives from 
the fact that the prohibition of torture – just like the 
prohibitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes – forms part of peremptory interna-
tional law (jus cogens). The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has 
stated:  
[I]t would seem that one of the consequences 
of the jus cogens character bestowed by the 
international community upon the prohibi-
tion of torture is that every State is entitled 
to investigate, prosecute, and punish or ex-
tradite individuals accused of torture who 
are present in a territory under its jurisdic-
tion. Indeed, it would be inconsistent on the 
one hand to prohibit torture to such an ex-
tent as to restrict the normally unfettered 
treaty making power of sovereign States, and 
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on the other hand bar States from prosecut-
ing and punishing those torturers who have 
engaged in this odious practice abroad. This 
legal basis for States’ universal jurisdiction 
over torture bears out and strengthens the 
legal foundation for such jurisdiction found 
by other courts in the inherently universal 
character of the crime. 
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-
T10, Trial chamber, ¶ 156 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 1998). 
*    *    * 
 The legislative practice of States is gradually 
expanding the permissible scope of universal juris-
diction. A number of States now have universal 
jurisdiction legislation covering other serious crimes 
involving gross human rights violations. For a com-
prehensive review of state practice, see Survey of 
Legislation, supra. In order to address gross viola-
tions targeting children, for instance, the United 
States of America asserts universal jurisdiction over 
anyone present in its territory who recruits, enlists, 
or conscripts a child under 15 years in an armed force 
or group, irrespective of the nationality of the of-
fender. See Child Soldier Accountability Act, Pub. L. 
No. 110-340, § 2442 (2008).  
*    *    * 
 The process of recognizing additional bases of 
universal jurisdiction has also advanced with regard 
to enforced disappearances, which at this point are 
22 
subject to universal jurisdiction. The High Commis-
sioner notes that the Convention for the Protection of 
all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which was 
adopted unanimously by the member States of the 
United Nations, obligates States parties to prosecute 
or extradite any alleged offender present in any 
territory under its jurisdiction. Article 9 reads as 
follows:  
1. Each State Party shall take the neces-
sary measures to establish its competence to 
exercise jurisdiction over the offence of en-
forced disappearance: 
(a) When the offence is committed in any 
territory under its jurisdiction or on board a 
ship or aircraft registered in that State; 
(b) When the alleged offender is one of its 
nationals; 
(c) When the disappeared person is one of 
its nationals and the State Party considers it 
appropriate. 
2. Each State Party shall likewise take 
such measures as may be necessary to estab-
lish its competence to exercise jurisdiction 
over the offence of enforced disappearance 
when the alleged offender is present in any 
territory under its jurisdiction, unless it ex-
tradites or surrenders him or her to another 
State in accordance with its international 
obligations or surrenders him or her to an 
international criminal tribunal whose juris-
diction it has recognized. 
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3. This Convention does not exclude any 
additional criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with national law. 
International Convention for the Protection of all 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, May 1, 2007, 
46 I.L.M. 441. 
 Article 9 of the Disappearances Convention 
closely tracks the language in Article 5 of the Conven-
tion against Torture. It follows mutatis mutandis that 
States must be allowed to exercise universal jurisdic-
tion over perpetrators of enforced disappearances 
found on their territory, given that the Disappear-
ances Convention requires the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction where no extradition request is made. 
 Furthermore, the argument set out by the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
that all jus cogens crimes are subject to universal 
jurisdiction (see supra pp. 20-21), also applies to 
enforced disappearances, given that the latter also 
violate jus cogens. See Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, ¶ 128 (Sept. 22, 
2006); see also Report of the Independent Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, ¶ 106, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69 (2012).  
 
C. Universal Jurisdiction Applies Also to 
Civil Cases and Extends, at a Minimum, 
as far as Universal Criminal Jurisdiction 
 While the preceding section focused on the uni-
versality principle in the context of criminal cases, 
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the principle applies equally to civil cases. Universal 
civil jurisdiction extends, at a minimum, to the same 
range of gross violations covered by universal crimi-
nal jurisdiction.  
 It would run counter to common sense and basic 
principles of legal reasoning to assume that inter-
national law prohibits States from exercising univer-
sal civil jurisdiction over the very same violations 
regarding which they may exercise universal criminal 
jurisdiction. Endorsing this reasoning, the Italian 
Court of Cassation, Italy’s highest court, recently 
observed that international crimes “threaten humani-
ty as a whole and undermine the very foundations of 
international coexistence” and hence “any State may 
suppress them, independent of the place where they 
were committed, in accordance with the principles of 
universal jurisdiction.” “For the same reason,” Italy’s 
high court continued, “there can be no doubt that the 
principle of universality of jurisdiction also applies to 
civil suits relating to such crimes.” See Ferrini v. 
Germany, Appeal decision, no. 5044/4, at ¶ 9, ILDC 
19 (IT 2004) (Mar. 11 2004) (translation according to: 
http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/Ferrini.pdf). 
*    *    * 
 The same principles of justice that underlie the 
application of universal criminal jurisdiction also call 
for the application of universal civil jurisdiction.  
 As discussed above (pp. 15-17), universal juris-
diction serves to address offenses against universally 
shared values and it seeks to ensure that victims of 
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such offenses are not left without the effective remedy 
to which they are entitled under international human 
rights law. The notion of an effective remedy extends 
beyond the need to bring the perpetrators to justice. A 
victim’s right to an effective remedy for gross viola-
tions of human rights carries two legitimate expecta-
tions: 
(1) that crimes are investigated with due 
diligence, identified perpetrators prosecuted 
in a fair trial and, if found guilty, subjected 
to appropriate punishment; and  
(2) that the perpetrator or the entity on 
whose behalf he or she was acting must pro-
vide full, adequate and timely reparation 
for the monetary and non-monetary conse-
quences of the crimes committed. 
The second aspect has been endorsed inter alia by 
the United Nations General Assembly, in a resolution 
adopted without vote, and hence reflecting the 
unanimous consent of all States: 
In accordance with its domestic laws and in-
ternational legal obligations, a State shall 
provide reparation to victims for acts or 
omissions which can be attributed to the 
State and constitute gross violations of in-
ternational human rights law or serious vio-
lations of international humanitarian law. In 
cases where a person, a legal person, or other 
entity is found liable for reparation to a vic-
tim, such party should provide reparation to 
the victim or compensate the State if the 
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State has already provided reparation to the 
victim. 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Viola-
tions of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. 
Res. 60/147, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 
2005) [hereinafter “Basic Principles”]; see also Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The 
Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (2004) (“Without reparation 
to individuals whose [rights under the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights] have been violated, the 
obligation to provide an effective remedy . . . is not 
discharged.”). 
 Retributive and compensatory justice go hand in 
hand. If international law allowed States to exercise 
universal criminal jurisdiction over gross violations, 
while prohibiting them from offering victims compen-
sation for the same violations, this would cut off the 
second leg of the principle of effective remedy, which 
universal jurisdiction is meant to protect. The very 
foundation of universal jurisdiction therefore indi-
cates that it must apply to both the criminal punish-
ment and the reparation aspect of a case.  
*    *    * 
 There is no principled reason why universal civil 
jurisdiction should be subject to more stringent limits 
than universal criminal jurisdiction. To the contrary, 
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the exercise of civil jurisdiction in relation to viola-
tions abroad is inherently less intrusive vis-à-vis both 
foreign nations and individual defendants than the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction.  
 The exercise of criminal jurisdiction is one of the 
hallmarks of sovereign power. When prosecuting 
crimes committed abroad, the prosecuting State 
always applies its own substantive criminal laws and 
may thereby project peculiar values embodied therein 
onto another State’s territory and people. In doing so, 
it might sometimes override deliberate sovereign 
choices of the territorial State, namely if the latter 
State wishes to forego punishment and grant am-
nesty or pardon. For the individual targeted by 
prosecution, his or her liberty is at stake. Moreover, 
where the territorial and another state assert crimi-
nal jurisdiction, the alleged perpetrator is placed at 
risk of being prosecuted or punished twice for the 
same crime; such double jeopardy can raise concerns 
from a human rights perspective.  
 Conversely, civil cases are typically initiated by a 
private party, rather than the State itself, and involve 
only pecuniary consequences. Moreover, the exercise 
of extraterritorial civil jurisdiction is subject to con-
flict of laws rules, according to which the State may 
forego the application of its own civil laws and apply 
those of the territorial State instead, in particular in 
relation to tort actions. 
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 Some have asserted that the exercise of civil 
jurisdiction in relation to acts abroad might be sub-
ject to fewer safeguards because the State prosecu-
tor’s control over initiating a criminal case ensures 
that extraterritorial criminal cases are brought only 
after prudent consideration, whereas civil claims can 
be brought by any private person. See Donald Francis 
Donovan and Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recogni-
tion of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 
142, 155 (2006). This neglects the fact that in many 
civil law jurisdictions, victims have an active role in 
the criminal process and can either force the prosecu-
tor to bring an action or initiate criminal actions as 
civil parties. In addition, almost all states, applying 
the wide margin of discretion international law 
affords them, have adopted private international law 
doctrines allowing them to dismiss cases that are 
manifestly unfounded or could be better addressed by 
the courts of other jurisdictions. This gives the State, 
through its courts, a level of control akin to that 
exercised by the prosecutor in criminal cases. 
 In accordance with the principle that the greater 
includes the lesser (argumentum a fortiori), one must 
therefore conclude that whatever is not prohibited 
with regard to the more intrusive exercise of univer-
sal criminal jurisdiction is certainly not prohibited 
with respect to the less intrusive exercise of universal 
civil jurisdiction. 
*    *    * 
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 These considerations of principle are also borne 
out by State practice, which shapes customary inter-
national law.  
 State practice suggests that the scope of univer-
sal civil jurisdiction might even be wider than that of 
universal criminal jurisdiction, bearing in mind that 
the “exercise of civil jurisdiction has been claimed by 
States upon far wider grounds than has been the case 
in criminal matters, and the resultant reaction by 
other States much more muted.” Malcolm Shaw, 
International Law 651 (6th ed. 2008). Some renowned 
scholars even suggest that States are completely free 
in determining the scope of their civil jurisdiction in 
relation to acts abroad. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, a 
former judge of the International Court of Justice, 
has stated that “apparently, public international law 
does not affect any delimitation of spheres of compe-
tence in the civil sphere, and seems to leave the 
matter entirely to private international law – that is 
to say in effect to the States themselves for determi-
nation, each in accordance with its own internal 
law . . . .” Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles 
of International Law Considered From the Standpoint 
of the Rule of Law, 92 Hague Recueil des cours 218 
(1957-II). Similarly, Professor Akehurst, author of the 
well-known textbook on international law, has found 
it “hard to resist the conclusion that . . . customary 
international law imposes no limits on the juris-
diction of municipal courts in civil trials.” Michael 
Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 Brit. 
Y.B. Int’l L. 145, 176 (1972-73); see also Peter 
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Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to Inter-
national Law 110 (7th ed. 1997).  
*    *    * 
 The absence of established state practice limiting 
jurisdiction in civil cases is also reflected in the 
failure of states to adopt a Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, despite two decades of negotiations under 
the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law.  
 A cross-regional alliance of states, including the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Japan, and the Republic of 
Korea, has insisted that the Hague Convention must 
include a “human rights exception” to ensure that 
civil cases involving international crimes or gross 
violations of human rights are not subject to any of 
the jurisdictional limits that the Hague Convention 
might introduce. See Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of 
Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human 
Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague 
Judgments Convention, 42 Harv. Int’l L.J. 141, 186 
(2001).  
*    *    * 
 States’ acceptance of universal civil jurisdiction 
goes beyond mere professions of support and is demon-
strated by their legislative and adjudicative practice. 
 Several States exercise a type of mixed universal 
jurisdiction functionally akin to the universal civil 
jurisdiction asserted under the Alien Tort Statute. 
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Many States of the civil law tradition allow victims to 
join criminal proceedings as civil parties or civil 
claimants with their own procedural rights. In line 
with this tradition, several States allow victims to 
join criminal proceedings brought under universal 
jurisdiction and claim compensation from the perpe-
trators. Clearly, the exercise of universal civil juris-
diction on its own is “no more threatening” to other 
nations than the application of universal jurisdiction 
laws that combine both criminal and civil jurisdiction 
by attaching tort recovery options to prosecutions, 
as Justice Breyer has rightfully observed. See Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762-763 (2004) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
 In 2007, for instance, a Belgian Court relied on 
universal jurisdiction to convict a Rwandan military 
officer of crimes against humanity that he had com-
mitted in Rwanda against other Rwandans (in ad-
dition to holding him accountable for the murder of 
Belgian peacekeepers). Several families of Rwandan 
victims who had joined the case as civil parties were 
awarded damages. See Case of the Major, Cour 
d’Assises de Bruxelles, Sept. 11, 2007 (decision on 
civil damages) (Belg.), as reported by Rwanda News 
Agency, Rwanda: Ntuyahaga to Pay Rwf 406 Million 
to Genocide Victims, September 12, 2007, http:// 
allafrica.com/stories/200709120762.html. 
 Among the countries that assert universal juris-
diction over international crimes and also allow the 
victims of such crimes to lodge civil claims are 
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Germany and the Netherlands, two of the States 
whose amicus curiae interventions in the present 
proceedings have called into question the exercise of 
universal tort jurisdiction by the United States.  
 Germany asserts universal jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, 
including, at the prosecutor’s discretion, where the 
perpetrator is not present in Germany. In accordance 
with general principles of German criminal proce-
dure, crime victims can claim compensation from 
anyone prosecuted under the International Crimes 
Penal Code. See Völkerstrafgesetzbuch [International 
Crimes Penal Code], Jun. 26, 2002, BGBl. I S. 2254, 
§§ 1&2, read in conjunction with Strafprozeßordnung 
[StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], Apr. 7, 1987, 
BGBl. I S. 1074, 1319, as amended by BGBl. I S. 3044 
§§ 153f, 403 (Ger.).  
 The Netherlands asserts universal jurisdiction 
over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes, provided the suspect is present on its terri-
tory. The victims can join the proceedings as injured 
parties and claim damages. See Wet Internationale 
Misdrijven [Act on Int’l Crimes], Stb. 2003, p. 270, 
Section 2, read in conjunction with Wetboek van 
Strafvordering [Sv] [Code of Criminal Proceedings], 
§ 51 art. a-f (Neth.). 
 Applying this framework in 2011, a Dutch Court 
convicted a Rwandan man for international crimes he 
committed in the context of the Rwandan genocide 
and awarded compensation to two Rwandan victims, 
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who had joined the proceedings. See Gerechtshof 
’s-Gravenhage, 22-002613-09, LJN: BR0686 (Neth.), 
Jul. 7, 2011, available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/ 
detailpage.aspx?ljn=BR0686.  
 The High Commissioner also draws the Court’s 
attention to a recent decision of a Dutch civil court, in 
which a non-national sued a group of Libyan nation-
als who had tortured him in a Libyan prison. The 
victim had since established residence in the Nether-
lands. Jurisdiction was asserted on the basis of a 
provision in the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure allow-
ing the Court to exercise jurisdiction as a forum 
necessitates in case of a non-national plaintiff suing 
a non-national defendant without residence in the 
Netherlands. The court accepted the plaintiff ’s argu-
ment that, under the circumstances, it would have 
been unacceptable for him to seek a remedy in a 
Libyan court. The court held that the defendants had 
acted unlawfully and ordered them, in absentia, to 
pay €750,000 in material damages and €250,000 in 
non-material damages to the plaintiff. Rechtbank 
’s-Gravenhage, Case of Ashraf Juma Hajuj (Neth.), 
Mar. 21, 2012, available at http://zoeken.rechtspraak. 
nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=BV9748. 
*    *    * 
 The legislative practice of the United States also 
supports the position that international law permits 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction in civil cases 
involving gross human rights violations. Notably, the 
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Torture Victim Protection Act, adopted in 1991, 
provides U.S. courts with universal civil jurisdiction 
over torture and extrajudicial killings. According to 
Article 2 of that Act: 
An individual who, under actual or apparent 
authority, or color of law, of any foreign na-
tion – 
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, 
in a civil action, be liable for damages to that 
individual; or 
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial 
killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for 
damages to the individual’s legal representa-
tive, or to any person who may be a claimant 
in an action for wrongful death. 
Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 
106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
 The record of Senate deliberations demonstrates 
that the legislature approved the Act fully cognizant 
of the fact that it would establish universal civil 
jurisdiction over torture and extrajudicial killings. 
See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration 
and Refugee Affairs of the Committee on the Judiciary 
United States Senate on S. 1629 and H.R. 1662, 101st 
Cong. (1990). In briefings presented during the 
deliberations, representatives of the Departments of 
Justice and State expressed their opposition to the 
draft legislation on three grounds: 1) possible nega-
tive foreign policy implications; 2) the U.S. position 
that universal jurisdiction was not required by the 
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Convention against Torture; and 3) the assertion that 
the Act departed from common law doctrines applied 
by U.S. courts. Id. Notably, none of the participants 
on record asserted that the exercise of universal civil 
jurisdiction over torture and extrajudicial killings 
contravened U.S. obligations under international law. 
To the contrary, the Torture Victim Protection Act 
itself states that it aims to “carry out obligations of 
the United States under the United Nations Charter 
and other international agreements.” Torture Victim 
Protection Act, supra, preamble.  
 
II. The Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in 
Civil Cases Involving Gross Human Rights 
Violations or Serious Violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Promotes the 
Full Realization of Widely Accepted In-
ternational Norms 
 The international community has made great 
strides towards establishing a culture of accountabil-
ity for gross violations of human rights and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. This 
development has been spurred by the exercise of 
jurisdiction by international tribunals and national 
courts.  
 While the quest for accountability was initially 
largely focused on criminal prosecution, it has become 
apparent that an approach to accountability that 
embodies universal human rights values and ensures 
the sustainable participation of the victims must 
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place victims’ legitimate demands at the centre of the 
response by providing them with realistic and effec-
tive avenues to obtain reparation for the unspeakable 
atrocities they have suffered.  
*    *    * 
 Compensation constitutes one crucial element of 
reparation. According to the United Nations’ Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law: 
Compensation should be provided for any 
economically assessable damage, as appro-
priate and proportional to the gravity of the 
violation and the circumstances of each case, 
resulting from gross violations of interna-
tional human rights law and serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law, 
such as: 
(a) Physical or mental harm; 
(b) Lost opportunities, including employ-
ment, education and social benefits; 
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, 
including loss of earning potential; 
(d) Moral damage; 
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assis-
tance, medicine and medical services, and 
psychological and social services. 
Basic Principles, supra, ¶ 19. 
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 On a practical level, compensation is often crucial 
because many victims of gross violations have very 
tangible needs. Many victims have lost their liveli-
hoods and the capacity to earn their living owing to 
the physical and psychological impact of atrocities 
endured. Likewise, the families of executed or dis-
appeared persons often find themselves deprived of 
the household’s primary breadwinner. Certain gross 
violations, namely sexual torture, also carry a heavy 
stigma and deprive the victims of the family and 
social support networks securing their survival. In 
many places, women who suffered sexual violence at 
the hands of State forces or armed groups find them-
selves struggling to secure their bare survival, be-
cause they cannot obtain compensation and have 
been ostracized by their own families and communi-
ties.  
 The reparation that a successful civil claim can 
afford extends far beyond mere pecuniary considera-
tions and includes the satisfaction victims derive 
from having the responsibility of the perpetrators 
recognized by an independent and impartial court. 
Indeed, victims often pursue civil claims in human 
rights-related cases, knowing that they will be unable 
to collect damages from the perpetrators even if the 
court rules in their favor. The opportunity to become 
actors in the pursuit of their tormentors empowers 
victims, especially in jurisdictions where criminal 
procedural law affords victims only a passive role. A 
judicial decision emanating from such an action is 
itself an element of reparation “restoring the dignity, 
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the reputation and the rights of the victim and of 
persons closely connected with the victim.” See Basic 
Principles, supra, ¶ 22(d). 
*    *    * 
 Many victims, or their bereaved families, also 
pursue actions against the perpetrators with the 
primary goal of establishing the truth about viola-
tions and the surrounding circumstances under which 
they occurred. In this regard, civil actions support the 
right to know the truth about violations and their 
circumstances, which international law gradually has 
come to recognize. See Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, Study on the Right to the 
Truth, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91 (2006); Right to the 
Truth, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/5/7 (2007). 
 Knowing the truth helps victims or their be-
reaved families obtain the sense of emotional closure 
necessary to reconstitute their lives. This is most 
apparent in cases of enforced disappearance, where 
the victims’ families do not know the fate of their 
loved ones, and live in tormenting anguish about 
whether they are dead or still alive. Society as a 
whole also benefits from shedding light on violations 
and their circumstances, as the “right to the truth 
serves to advance respect for the rule of law, trans-
parency, honesty, accountability, justice, and good 
governance – all key principles underlying a democ-
ratic society.” See Tara E. Foley, Panel Discussion on 
the Right to the Truth at the 13th Session of the 
Human Rights Council: Statement by the Delegation 
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of the United States of America (Mar. 9, 2010), 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/03/10/right-to-truth. 
In this regard, “public knowledge of [victims’] suffer-
ing and the truth about the perpetrators, including 
their accomplices, of these violations are essential 
steps towards rehabilitation and reconciliation. . . .” 
Commission on Human Rights Res. 2003/72, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/72 ¶8 (Apr. 25, 2003).  
*    *    * 
 Despite victims’ dire needs for material compen-
sation, restoration of dignity, and knowledge of the 
truth, national avenues to obtain redress are often 
foreclosed. In many cases, gross violations are com-
mitted by or with the connivance of State authorities, 
who are therefore unlikely to offer any timely and 
effective recourse. Other violations may occur in weak 
states that are unable to prevent violations and 
consequently also unable to ensure that victims can 
obtain reparations from the perpetrators. Many 
surviving victims also have fled their home countries 
and it is unrealistic to expect them to brave physical 
risk and rekindle traumatic memories to return to 
their home countries to file reparations cases. 
*    *    * 
 In the current state of affairs, victims therefore 
must often rely on access to the courts of other na-
tions, even though victims may share few links with 
those nations, apart from their common humanity.  
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 This is in particular the case since many vio-
lations are beyond the reach of international mech-
anisms. For some victims, regional human rights 
courts with a mandate to order reparations can 
provide an effective avenue to obtain remedies. 
However, such courts do not exist in all regions. Even 
where they do exist, countries with problematic 
human rights records will often not accept their 
jurisdiction. In the same vein, the geographical reach 
of international criminal tribunals, some of which 
have the power to order convicted perpetrators to pay 
reparation, is also limited and States implicated in 
gross human rights violations often remain beyond 
their grasp. Moreover, criminal tribunals can order 
individual perpetrators to pay damages, but those 
tribunals cannot assess fines against corporate enti-
ties that have profited from gross human rights 
violations.  
*    *    * 
 In the current state of affairs, therefore, victims 
must rely on the solidarity and comity of other na-
tions. If no country exercised universal civil jurisdic-
tion, many victims would be left without any avenue 
of recourse for lack of being able to demonstrate a 
jurisdictional link to any country but their own. 
Furthermore, without universal civil jurisdiction, 
corporations and individuals involved in the worst 
atrocities in one country could go about their business 
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in other countries, as if such atrocities were of no 
concern to humanity as a whole.  
 With these considerations in mind, the High 
Commissioner supports the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction for purposes of both prosecution and 
reparation, including through the Alien Tort Statute. 
Actions brought under the Alien Tort Statute have 
provided many victims with a beacon of hope, derived 
from the knowledge that there are independent and 
impartial courts willing to recognise that their tor-
mentors violated the law of nations. The prospect of 
tort claims has also denied perpetrators a safe haven 
where they would be shielded from legal action. 
 Perhaps even more importantly, the existence of 
accountability mechanisms such as the Alien Tort 
Statute has had a positive deterrent effect. The 
prospect of facing legal action has brought many 
businesses to examine and, where necessary revise, 
their business practices to ensure that they will not 
become complicit in gross violations. This has spurred 
progress in developing voluntary industry initiatives 
aimed at ensuring that businesses apply due dili-
gence to prevent their complicity in gross human 
rights violations. Incidentally, this has also “levelled 
the playing field” to some extent as any company 
profiting or participating in gross violations, 
whether American or foreign, may face scrutiny 
under the Alien Tort Statute based on the same 
universal standards. In turn, increased due diligence 
commitments on the part of business entities can 
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also have a positive effect on States with a problem-
atic human rights record. Such States are becoming 
increasingly aware that they have to change their 
own governance practices if they want to continue 
obtaining the foreign investment and expert knowl-
edge provided by respectable business enterprises.  
 In certain cases, actions brought in the U.S. 
under the Alien Tort Statute have triggered a genuine 
national debate in other countries about gross and 
systematic violations, such as the use of slave labor. 
As a result, compensation programs were set up that 
may not have otherwise been adopted.  
 The High Commissioner urges the Court to keep 
these positive implications in mind when deciding 
whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort 
Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action 
for violations of the law of nations occurring within 
the territory of a sovereign other than the United 
States. On an ethical level, comity is owed as much to 
fellow human beings who suffer from the worst 
atrocities as to the nations representing them. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, the High Commissioner 
urges the Court to state clearly that international law 
permits the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction in 
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tort cases involving gross human rights violations or 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
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